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Huge and McCarthy: Collective Bargaining in the 1980's - Comments and Observations

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE 1980'S -

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS*
Harry Huge and Layne Carlough McCarthy**
INTRODUCTION

A nationwide shift in the bargaining objectives of American
unions is apparently occurring. A pattern of union concessions and
management demands is commonplace as 1982's collective bargaining
calendar proceeds. This change in fundamental priorities and
relationships has been blamed on the deep recession, inflation,
foreign competition, political climate,' and the advent of automation. 2 However, as this paper will discuss, this change may be
essential to the survival of certain industries of this country, and may
set precedents beneficial in the future to both sides of the bargaining
table.
Whether collective bargaining is entering a "major new era," as
3
most predict, awaits the passage of time. This majority view
contends that an immediate positive aspect emerging from our
nation's deteriorating economic condition has been an "increasing
awareness by labor and management of the need to cooperate in
countering mutual problems, such as foreign competition, energy
'4
shortages, and plant and product obsolescence." Nevertheless,
*This paper was prepared in March 1982 for presentation at the Edward F. Carlough
Labor Law Conference held June 9, 1982, at Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead,
N.Y. It does not reflect events that have occurred after that date.
**Mr. Huge, a partner in the firm of Rogovin, Huge & Lenzner, Washington, D.C.,
received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law School in 1963. Ms. McCarthy, until
recently an associate with the firm of Rogovin, Huge & Lenzner, received her J.D. from Hofstra
University School of Law in 1981.
1. For example, the breaking of PATCO during the air traffic controllers strike by the
Reagan Administration signaled a far different political atmosphere from labor relations with
previous administrations.
2. Major Shift in Bargaining Goals [Analysis/News &Background Information] 1 LAB.
REL. REP.(BNA) (109 Lab. Rel. Rep.) 207 (Mar. 8, 1982).
3. However, as Business Week reports, at least one scholar believes otherwise: "Those
who speculate that wage concessions will spread through the economy and create basic changes
are 'creating unrealistic expectations and bargaining problems, which somebody will have to
settle, [says John Dunlop, a Harvard University professor.] It is not a major new era, and that
I'm willing to sign my name to."' ModerationsChance to Survive, Bus. Wk., Apr. 19, 1982, at
123.
4. Ruben, OrganizedLabor in 1981: A Shifting of Priorities, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Jan.
1982, at 21.
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whatever the fiture, both unions and management face the hard
realities of the moment; and the choices that each side is forced to
make not only are heated by policy concerns but by legal
consequences as well. Both unions and management are venturing
into new ground, from mid-contract concessions to a more dominant
role for unions in the management of corporations. Some of these
issues will be explored in this paper.
MID-CONTRACT CONCESSIONS

Duty to Renegotiate Generally
An array of new questions has been thrust upon the unions as
they ponder the consequences of the next visit to the bargaining
table. One of the more recent dilemmas confronting a union is
whether to make "concessions" while a contract is still in effect - the
mid-contract concession. The question that arises is whether the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement have a duty to
renegotiate that agreement during its term. Section 8(d)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA") resolves this question, as
follows:
[Tihe duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and
conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such
modification is to become effective before such terms and
conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the
contract ....

5

The recent distress associated with mid-contract concessions,
though, has not been brought about by either party instituting an
action to force the reopening of a contract, as in previously mentioned
cases. Rather, the premature gravitation to the bargaining table has
been effectuated, in most cases, by an awareness on both sides of a
rapidly deteriorating economy and a need for a reassessment of the
positions on both sides. In the case of the United Auto Workers (the
"UAW"), Ford and General Motors, not to mention a long list of other
industries, the economic crisis has resulted in threatened and actual
plant closings. The UAW came to the table with plans to thwart this
devastating source of unemployment. They proposed wage concessions in return for job security, and a greater union voice in
5. § 8(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1976). See also Oak-Cliff Colman Baking Co., 207
NLRB 1063, 85 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1973), enforced mem., 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975), and Sheltering Pines Convalescent Hospital, 255 NLRB 1195, 107
L.R.R.M. 1145 (1981).
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management decisions about when and whether to close a plant, and
in sub-contracting. What can the union do when the employer is
deciding to close a plant? Can the union force an employer to bargain
about his decision to shut down a plant? Should he grant wage
concessions to avert a plant shutdown? What are the competing
interests and how should they be dealt with at the bargaining table?
Duty to Bargain Over Decisions to PartiallyTerminate Business
The Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue of whether an
employer has a duty to bargain over the partial termination of his
6
business in FirstNational Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. Is a partial
closing decision to be considered a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining? The Supreme Court found it was not, and the Court
concluded that employers' decisions to terminate portions of their
businesses are not mandatory subjects under Section 8(d) of the
NLRA. 7 Employers however, must give notice of and engage in
8
meaningful bargaining about the effects of partial terminations. The
Court's decision rests on a close analysis of Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of
the NLRA. 9
First National Maintenance Corporation ("FNM") was a business
that provided housekeeping, cleaning and maintenance services for
commercial customers. In the Spring of 1977, FNM began providing
services for Greenpark Nursing Home, but it soon realized that it was
losing money, and it requested an increase in its weekly fee. In early
July, FNM told Greenpark that it would discontinue its services
unless Greenpark provided the fee increase. On July 28, FNM
informed its workers at Greenpark that they would be terminated in
three days. The union immediately asked FNM to delay the
termination pending collective bargaining but the company refused
the offer to bargain. Unfair labor practice charges were filed against
the company which alleged that FNM had breached its duty under
the Act by failing to bargain over the termination and its effects. The
NLRB sustained the union's charges and ordered the company to
10 The
bargain in good faith with the union about both subjects.
6. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
7. Id. at 686.
8. Id. at 681-82.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(d) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) provides in pertinent part: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representative of his employees...
Section 8(d) provides in pertinent part: "For purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and to confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment..
10. 242 NLRB 462, 463, 101 L.R.R.M. 1177, 1178-79 (1979).
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Second Circuit, although differing over the appropriate rationale,
affirmed the Board's order." The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court held the employer had no duty to bargain
about its economically based decision to terminate a part of its
business.12 Concentrating on the concept of mandatory bargaining,
the Court quoted from FibreboardPaperProductsCorp. v. NLRB ,13
and explained the origin of mandatory bargaining:
The aim of labeling a matter a mandatory subject of bargaining
... is to "promote the fundamental purpose of the Act by
bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management
within the framework established by Congress as most conducive
to industrial peace."'
The Court, in determining whether bargaining would firther the
purposes of the NLRA, balanced the possible harm to the employer's
freedom of operation against the benefit to be gained through the
union's participation in the decisionmaking process. The Court set
out its balancing test by stating that "in view of an employer's need for
unencumbered decisionmaking," such freedom to make decisions
should be abridged "only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and collective bargaining process outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business."' 15 The Court concluded that
the likelihood of harm to an employer's freedom to operate
outweighed any benefit that might be gained by union participation in
decisionmaking. The Court, therefore, held that "the decision itself is
not part of Section 8(d)'s 'terms and conditions' over which Congress
has mandated bargaining."' 16
The majority opinion in First National Maintenance has been
berated for its vagueness, lack of guidance, and overall disingenuousness. 17 Justice Blackmun enunciated a balancing test but he failed to
provide guidance for its application. 18 The Court left unanswered
questions concerning the determination of what is "beneficial" for
labor relations and the collective bargaining process, and what is
not. 19
11.

627 F.2d 596 (2nd Cir. 1980).

12. 452 U.S. at 686.
13. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
14. 452 U.S. at 677-78.
15. Id. at 679.
16. Id. at 686.
17. See, e.g., Gacek, The Employers Duty to Bargain on Termination of Unit Work, 32
LAB. L. J. 699 (1981).
18.
19.

Id. at 713.
Id. at 712.
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Justice Brennan, in his dissent, also criticized Blackmun's
balancing test for its speculative premises and one-sided approach to
resolving two-sided controversies. 20 Justice Brennan concluded that
the majority's balancing test takes into account "only the interests of
management; it fails to consider the legitimate interests of the
21
workers and their union."
An additional unresolved question flows from Justice Blackmun's
balancing test. "When does the benefit of bargaining outweigh the
employer's interest in having complete and unencumbered control
over the fate of his employees?" 2 2 The majority opinion acknowledged the concerns of both labor and management over a partial
closing decision. The Court emphasized the need management may
have for "speed, flexibility and secrecy in meeting business
opportunities and exigencies. "23 The Court continued its communication of the employer's view by stating that:
The publicity incident to the normal process of bargaining may
injure the possibility of successful transition or increase the
economic damage to the business. The employer also may have no
feasible alternative to the closing and even good-faith bargaining
over it may be both futile and cause the employer additional
loss.24
In a vacuum, Justice Blackmun's emphasis on management's
need for speed, flexibility and secrecy seems plausible. However, as
Justice Brennan stated, "in view of management's admitted duty to
bargain over the effects of a closing, it is difficult to understand why
additional bargaining over the closing itself would necessarily unduly
25
delay or publicize the decision."
Justice Blackmun articulated assumptions about the interest of
the union; however, support for his conclusions are absent from the
text.26 Justice Brennan's response to this argument in his dissenting
opinion is more persuasive. He cited the UAW and Chrysler
20. 452 U.S. 666, 689-90 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
21. Id. at 689.
22. Gacek, supra note 25, at 712-13.
23. 452 U.S. at 682-83.
24. Id. at 683.
25. Id. at 691 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
26. A union's interest in participating in the decision to close ... part of an
employer's operations springs from its legitimate concern over job security.... No
doubt it will be impelled, in seeking these ends, to offer concessions, information, and
alternatives that might be helpful to management or forestall or prevent the
termination ofjobs. It is unlikely, however, that requiring bargaining over the decision
itself, as well as its effects, will augment this flow of information and suggestions.
Id. at 681.
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Corporation negotiations as an example of decision-bargaining "which
led to significant adjustments in compensation and benefits
contributing to Chrysler's ability to remain afloat." 2 7 The positive
effects of decision-bargaining are apparent in the recent negotiations
between UAW, Ford and GM. In both situations, table talks brought
concessions from both sides which resulted in stays of several
imminent plant closures. Although the majority opinion in First
National Maintenance emphasized and protected the concerns of the
employer, it failed to consider adequately the legitimate interests of
the workers. The NLRB, on the other hand, perfectly expressed the
nature of the employees' interest in a partial closing determination in
Ozark Trailers, Inc. 28
For, just as the employer has invested capital in the business, so
the employee has invested years of his working life, accumulating
seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills, that may
or may not be salable to another employer. And, just as the
employer's interest in the protection of his capital investment is
entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the Act, so too is
the employee's interest in the protection of his livelihood. 29
Since the decision in First National Maintenance, several
decisions have come down addressing the issue of an employer's duty
to bargain over the partial termination of a business. In U.S.
Contractors, Inc., 3 ° the union alleged that U.S. Contractors, Inc.
("USC") had refused to bargain over both its decision to cease
operating its janitorial division and the impact of this decision upon
the employees. 3 1 The Board, in reversing the ruling of the
Administrative Law Judge, relied on FirstNationalMaintenance and
found that there had not been a violation of Sections 8(a)(5) or 8(a)(3)
of the Act. The Board stated the balancing test enunciated in First
National Maintenance in the following manner:
[Wihen economic reasons compel an employer to decide whether
or not to shut down a part of its business, the employer's need to
operate freely outweighs any incremental benefit that might be
gained through a union's participation in the decisionmaking. 3 2
The Board found the employer's motivations for terminating the
janitorial division to be economic in nature and dismissed all related
33
charges against the employer.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161 NLRB 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
Id. at 566, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
257 NLRB No. 152, 108 L.R.R.M. 1048 (1981).
Id. slip op. at 3, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
Id. slip op. at 6, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
Id. slip op. at 8, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
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Another recent case, Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 34
involved the failure of an employer to bargain over the closing of a
facility. The NLRB concluded that the employer had breached its
duty to bargain with the union over a mandatory subject and
thereafter filed an application for enforcement of its bargaining order.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the Board had not
set forth sufficient information regarding the conditions leading to the
employer's decision to close its facility. The Court noted that the
Board should hold further proceedings to produce a more thorough
record. The Board complied with this suggestion but, while the
petitions for enforcement and review were pending, the Supreme
Court decided FirstNationalMaintenance. After consideration of the
Supreme Court opinion, the Third Circuit, in its second opinion,
directed the Board to dismiss the unfair labor practice charges against
the employer.A5
Duty to Bargain over Complete Terminations and Sales of Businesses
The analysis used in partial termination cases also has been
applied in cases concerning a decision to completely close and to sell a
portion of a business. In Merryweather Optical,3 6 the NLRB held
that although there was no duty to bargain about the decision
regarding a complete cessation of business, the employer was still
obligated to discuss the impact and effect of closing upon the
bargaining unit employees. 3 7 General Motors Corp.3 8 addressed the
application of the NLRA to the decision to sell a business. Again, the
Board found that a decision affecting the direction of the business
through significant investments or withdrawal of capital is a matter
which is essentially managerial in nature. 39 Therefore, there is no
duty to bargain over the decision to sell a business; but, bargaining
over the effect of the decision is required.
34. 230 NLRB 1002, 95 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1977), enforcement denied, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd
Cir. 1978).
35. 251 NLRB 29, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980), enforcement denied, 656 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir.
1981). The Supreme Court's decision in First National Maintenance, has thwarted any attempts
to force an employer to bargain over his economically motivated decision to close part of his
business. Nevertheless, there appear to be some indirect ways of dealing with this problem.
One of these methods has appeared on the state level where legislative remedies are being
developed to help alleviate the impact of plant closings on workers and communities. Some of
the common features of the proposals, as reported in the January 1982 edition of Monthly Labor
Review, are advance notice, severance pay entitlement to retirement benefits, creation of a
community assistance fund and employee option to purchase the plant.
36. 240 NLRB 1213, 100 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1979).
37. Id. at 1215, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1414.
38. 191 NLRB 951, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), enforced sub nom, UAW, Local 864 v.
NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 952, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539.
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Impact of Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
on Plant and Business Closings
The collective bargaining relationship has adapted to changes in
the economy as the players have shifted their priorities in bargaining
talks. Legislative enactments also have been a force behind
alterations in both management and labor decisionmaking. The
Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 198040 (the "Act")
is one such example.
The Act has caused confusion and consternation since its passage
in 1980. MPPA is a complex and tortuous attempt to deal with the
problem of securing financial stability in private pension plans in
order to pay pensions some time in the future. The Act tried to come
to grips with the issue of liability and responsibility when an employer
leaves a plan, either by terminating the plan for covered employees or
by simply withdrawing from the plan. The Act concentrates its efforts
on improving the financial integrity and ability of multi-employer
pension plans to assure plan continuation while limiting individual
employer costs. Whether 4 the Act is accomplishing these goals is a
subject of intense debate. '
On February 4, 1982, the American Trucking Association
("ATA") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
- Jackson Division. 42 The ATA's lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of the Act on behalf of all ATA member companies. The ATA
contends that the Act violates the Constitution on the grounds of
contract impairment, a public taking without just compensation, a
lack of procedural and substantive process, and the removal of the
right to a jury trial. The Act, says the ATA, impairs such normal
commercial activity as going out of business, changing business
40. Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94
Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified at § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1001a) (Supp. IV 1980).
41. See, e.g., The Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1982, at 30, col. 2:
Executives from four industries charged that a 1980 pension law unfairly burdens
their companies, weakens unions' organizing efforts and hurts the retirement funds it
sought to protect.
The federal law sought to shore up shaky multiemployer pension plans, which are
negotiated by unions and employers, by imposing stiffer penalties for companies that
quit them. But the law also has saddled employers with millions of dollars in
sometimes unexpected pension liabilities when they buy, sell, move or close
operations. About 78 lawsuits have been filed, mostly against pension funds, attacking
the complex law as unconstitutional.
42. C. Taylor, A. Sampon, III, G. Summers, S. Vaughn, Status Report on Litigation
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments (June 28,
1982) (unpublished) (available from the firm of Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, D.C.).
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locations, borrowing money, and expanding operations. The ATA's
broadside attack on the Act is just one of the more than seventy-eight
43
cases filed since the Act's passage on September 26, 1980.

The Act forces managers who make decisions concerning plant
closings, and other events which may be a complete or partial
termination, to consider another often dominant element in the
equation of labor-management relations. Since the Act does not apply
to single employer plans, the drive for multi-employer nationwide
pension plans may founder on another good intention-guaranteed
financial security for the existing plans. Employers in the coal,
construction and trucking industries will seek ways to withdraw from
multi-employer plans and their potential massive liabilities. This
possibility could lead to acrimonious collective bargaining in these
industries in the years ahead. It also may cause employers to keep a
plant open with a skeleton crew-after laying off the bulk of the
employees-to avoid triggering the Act's partial termination
provisions, which may result in added financial requirements.
One thing seems certain. Either Congress is going to have to
write a yearly or bi-yearly series of amendments in order to deal with
the changing economic conditions of pension plans, or the courts will
do it for them. One must remember that The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, ("ERISA")4 4 was passed in response to
individual employees losing their pensions, and the massive fraud and
mismanagement of several large and highly visible pension and health
plans. 4 5 Congress is being forced to respond to a massive flight away
from multi-employer plans caused by the real or perceived financial
straight jacket that many employers, and union leaders, believe has
been placed on these fine, flexible, 46and absolutely necessary
institutions - the multi-employer plans.
43.

See, e.g., cases involving provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001) (1976 and Supp.
IV 1980), and questions of whether to pay contributions to multi-employer plans have come
before the Court twice this term. The Supreme Court, in Kaiser Steel v. Mullins, 102 S.Ct. 851
(1982) held that under federal case law illegal promises to contribute could not be enforced
under ERISA.
Three days after Kaiser Steel, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 18, 1982 in
National Stabilization Agreement of the Sheet Metal Industry Trust Fund v. Commerical
Roofing & Sheet Metal, 655 F.2d 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied 102 S.Ct. 1256 (1982), in
which a similar issue was disposed of both by U.S. District Court Judge Green, and a three
judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. One case-Kaiserv. Mullins-arosein the
coal industry, while the other-SASMI -arose in the construction industry.
44. § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) and Supp. IV 1980).
45. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F.Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
46. This article borrowed ideas and analysis from a superb unpublished paper on the
Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act, written by Robert Bach, Associate General
Counsel for The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.
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INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF UNIONS WHEN FACED WITH DEMANDS FOR
MID-CONTRACT CONCESSIONS

Collective Interest versus Individual Interest
The institution of American labor unions involves a continuing
accommodation between the interests of the individual member and
those of the group.4 7 A recent conflict in the town of Kellogg, Idaho
provides a vivid illustration of this group/individual dichotomy.
Kellogg was the site of the Bunker Hill Company, a mining and
smelting business, whose employees were represented by the United
Steel Workers Union. By August of 1981, the effect of the deepening
recession had reached the Bunker Hill plant. The plant's excessive
losses would force it to close unless the owners could find a buyer. A
few months later, the employees thought that their problem had been
remedied when a group of local investors expressed an interest in
buying the plant. However, their purchase was contingent upon the
imposition of a substantial cut in labor costs. The plan which was
presented to the workers required substantial cuts across the board
by the union, including a waiver of employee pension and insurance
48
rights, without requiring any guarantees by the potential buyers.
The leaders of the United Steel Workers local union
recommended a vote against acceptance. Thereafter, during a local
union meeting, a motion was made to conduct an advisory vote on the
issue. The members were informed that the vote was to be advisory
and not binding. On January 17, 1982, members of the nine plant
craft unions, including the Steelworkers, voted 695 to 506 to accept
the local investors' proposal. 4 9 However, the workers' celebration
over the retention of their jobs was short-lived. The International
refused to sign the agreement, and the deal collapsed. The national
union leaderships' position was that they had been presented with a
"'take it or leave it" offer, there had been no chance for negotiations,
and the plan contained "take aways" which raised serious legal
questions. Moreover, the International felt that the spectre of Bunker
Hill might spread to other areas of the country.
The Bunker Hill situation raises a number of issues. First, does a
union breach its duty of fair representation to its members by refusing
to accept a deal that would save jobs? Second, may a union negotiate a
contract without the ratification of its membership? Third, what are
47. Comment, Smith v. Hussman RefrigeratorCo.: FairRepresentation and the Erosion
of Collective Values, 76 Nw U.L. REv. 519, 538 (1981).
48. Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1982, at A9, col. 3.
49. Id.
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the concerns of a union when it grants concessions at the bargaining
table?
The events of January 1982 in Kellogg brought two interests into
conflict: the interest of individual employees in saving their jobs
versus the union's interest in negotiating. As previously stated, the
opportunity to "negotiate" would not have afforded the union an
agreement that best served the interests of all union members
nationwide. The union was aware that the outcome of an agreement
in one area of the country might set the tone for negotiations in other
parts of the country.
The union serves as the exclusive representative in negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement. As such, it must attempt to
represent a broad range of interests. The doctrine of exclusive
representation permits the chosen labor organization to bind the
membership to the choices of the representative, subject, of course,
to the duty of fair representation.
The Duty of FairRepresentation
The establishment of a national labor policy was a response to the
inequities in bargaining power between organized employers and
their individual employees. A recognition of the effectiveness of
collective strength fostered the development of union and labor
organization. Due to this emphasis on united strength, however, the
"interests of individual employees were necessarily subjugated to the
larger collective interest." 50 The duty of fair representation was the
result of a need to protect individual employees while maintaining
effective collective bargaining.
In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad51 the Supreme Court
first attempted to reconcile the sometimes divergent interests of the
individual employee and the union. The Court held that the union, as
the exclusive representative, has a duty to "protect equally the
interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon
the legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for
52
whom it legislates."In Steele, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen negotiated a contract which would have ultimately
excluded all black firemen from service. The Court found it unlawful
for a union to negotiate such a contract, and concluded that it was the
50. Levine & Hollander, The Unions' Duty of Fair Representation in Contract
Administration, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 193, 194 (1981).
51. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
52. Id. at 202.
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express aim of Congress to impose upon the representative of a craft
"the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all
those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
53
them."
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 54 a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement which gave seniority credit for preemployment military service was attacked as exceeding the authority
granted to a union representative under the NLRA. The Supreme
Court emphasized the need for the delegation of discretion to union
negotiators. The negotiators derive strength from the ability to
exercise discretion by making concessions and accepting advantages
which are believed to be in the best interest of all parties
represented. 5 5
In support of allocating discretion to the bargaining representative the Court stated:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
56
discretion.
The Court further stated that prospects for the future are often based
on compromises made in the present and that such compromises are
57
"natural incidents of negotiation."
The language used by the Court in Ford Motor Co. would be an
appropriate response to charges by the Bunker Hill employees that
the Steelworkers Union had breached its duty of fair representation.
But this is a legal answer, and not necessarily a wise one for a union
leader faced with an anxious membership seeing their jobs vanish.
Yet, the American labor movement has been built upon decisions
between short-term considerations and long-term concerns. It is
imperative that union representatives have the flexibility in
negotiations to make presently unpopular decisions for the
preservation of future goals, so long as these decisions are not made
58
discriminatorily, arbitrarily or in bad faith.
53.

54.

Id. at 203.
345 U.S. 330 (1953).

55. Id. at 338.
56.
57.
58.

Id.

Id.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated its justification for the
subordination of some individual interests to the collective interests
of the whole in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System. 59 The
Court stated that:
Since a union's objective is to maximize overall compensation of its
members, not to ensure that each employee receives the best

compensation deal available, cf. Gardner-Denver,. . . 415 U.S.,
at 58 n.19, .

.

. a union balancing individual and collective

interests might validly permit some employees' statutorily granted
wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative
expenditure of resources would result in 60increased benefits for
workers in the bargaining unit as a whole.
Although the union has been given broad latitude in fifilling its
duty of fair representation, the scope and substantive content of this
61 The
duty have been expanded by the Board and the courts.
expansion of the duty of fair representation requires the union to
disclose facts which are essential for informed employee decisionmaking. A failure to reveal information which leads members to make
uninformed or unfavorable judgments may constitute a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation.
In Warehouse Union, Local 860 v. NLRB, 6 2 the Board found that
the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA when it failed to
advise the membership of prior threats of job loss by the employer.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's
decision and found that "the union had a duty to inform its
membership of management's position so that they, in turn, could
63 Such
make an informed reassessment of their wage demand."
failure to communicate the employer's position is an "arbitrary
action" and, therefore, a breach of the union's duty of fair
64
representation.
Ratification of the Collective BargainingAgreement
The principle of exclusive representation allows a union to
negotiate a contract without the ratification of its members. The
NLRA does not require a union to afford its membership the right to
ratify a collective bargaining agreement which the union has
negotiated. 6 5 However, where the constitution, by-laws, or articles of
59. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
60. Id. at 742.
61. Levine & Hollander, supra note 57, at 203.
62. 236 NLRB 844, 98 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1978), enforced 652 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
63. 652 F.2d at 1025.
64. Id.
65. International Brotherhood ofTeamsters v. NLRB, 226 NLRB 772, 94 L.R.R.M. 1239
(1976), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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a union provide for membership vote on collective bargaining
agreements, the union must comply. 66 In Christopher, the Court
concluded that the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor
Organizations" 6 7 protects the right of members to ratify agreements
when it is so provided. The Court did not decide whether members
have a right, under Section 411(a)(1), to vote on substantive changes
in collective bargaining agreements when no provision expressly
providing such vote is contained in the constitution, by-laws or
articles of a union.6 8
A recent complaint filed with the NLRB raised the issue of a
membership's right to vote on concessions to an employer.69 The
Regional Director concluded that there was no obligation on the part
of the labor organization to negotiate a modification of an existing
collective bargaining agreement. In the end, the President of the
International invoked his authority under the International
Constitution and disallowed the submission of employer proposals to
the membership.70
A close review of the Union's Constitution, By-laws and Articles
seems necessary to determine the duty owed to the membership
regarding the ratification of any labor-management agreements.
Bargaining Tactics During Periods of Economic Re-adjustment:
"Bankrupt Companies Are Not Good Employers"
- John L. Lewis
The combination of many factors form the basis of one party's
bargaining power.71 Legislative enactments often reflect the
66.
67.

Christopher v. Safeway Stores, 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981).
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976). Section 411(a)(1) provides:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums
of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the
deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable
rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
68. 644 F.2d at 470 n. 2.
69. UFCW Int'l Union and RSEU Local 40, UFCW (Kroger Co.) NLRB No. 7-LC-5211
(1981).
70. This case is discussed in a superb paper by Theodore Sachs, Mid Contract Changes
and The Duty of Fair Representation (unpublished) (available from the firm of Marston, Sachs,
Nunn, Kates, Kadushin and O'Hare of Michigan).
71. The negotiator assesses his strengths and weaknesses prior to taking his place at the
bargaining table. He evaluates his position in relation to the power possessed by the opposition.
This evaluation process has been divided into three steps: "First, the bargainers evaluate their
own power capability and that of their opponents. Second, given these perceptions of power,
the bargainers consider the likelihood that the power capability will be actually used. Third, in
the context of their power situation, bargainers evaluate their own tactical options and attempt
to anticipate their opponent's tactics." S. Bacharach & E. Lawler, Power and Tactics in
Bargaining, 34 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 220 (1981).
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economic status of the country and its ideological preferences. These
two factors are instrumental in the assessment of one's bargaining
power.
Today's economic climate has forced many unions to alter their
battle plans. The "offensive game" strategy of the past two decades
has been put on hold, and a "defensive game plan" has been called
upon. Concerns over "job security" have replaced demands for
increased wages. The priorities have changed. Employees, fearful of
becoming another statistic on the long list of the unemployed, have
softened what were once tough positions on increased wages and
other benefits. Examples of this change in bargaining strategy during
the past year are numerous. The agreement between the UAW and
GM was highlighted both by a moratorium on plant closings and by
other steps to save jobs.
In the preceding months, the UAW had come to the table several
times; each effort ended in failure. Douglas Fraser, the President of
the UAW, realized the importance of coming to an agreement quickly
and he recognized the UAW's bargaining strength would come from
their ability to make concessions reducing the company's $19.80
average hourly labor cost. 72 Such concessions came in the form of
wage freezes, reductions in personal holidays, and other compromises. Labor's chief weapon, the strike, may have seemed like an
advisable means to a desired end at a time when the economy was
stronger. However, Fraser acknowledged such a strike would be a
long and bitter battle, largely fought from a position of weakness. 73
The continuing decline in labor productivity is one factor having
an adverse effect on a company's financial health and the strength of
the union's bargaining power. 74 In the face of declining productivity,
energy is poured into the fight against plant closings, and the once
persuasive wage increase argument falls by the wayside. "Sooner or
later even the most tenacious and effective union will learn the
Lewis's remark that 'bankrupt companies aren't
wisdom of John L.
''
good employers.' 5
While high wages have been blamed for productivity decline and
the country's inability to compete in foreign markets, management
must take an even larger share of the blame. Management, not labor
leaders, made the decisions at GM, Ford, Chrysler and American
72. Brown, GM, Union Tentatively Agree on Pactto Save Money, Jobs, Wash. Post, Mar.
22, 1982, at A5, col. 1.
73 Id.
74. J. Krislov & J. Silver, CurrentChallenges in IndustrialRelations: Union Bargaining
Power in the 1980's, 32 LAB. L. J. 480, 482 (1981).
75. Id.
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Motors during' the past twenty years. Management's argument that
union successes are the cause of their problems, in effect, concedes
union leaders out-bargained management.
The recent trend in management-labor relations has seen a
retreat from these adversarial attacks to a realization that the survival
of both sides may depend upon mutual cooperation. The press has
depicted the union as the one making concessions, but an important
feature in recent negotiations has been "a recognition by management
that concessions, including more participation for workers in
management decisions, are called for on their side of the table as
well. "76
The values of the work force are changing, resulting in a demand
for increased participation in management planning and decisionmaking.
Union's Role in Managing a Company
When the President of the UAW, Douglas Fraser, joined the
Board of Directors of Chrysler Corporation in 1980, it was a unique
and bold step in American labor-management relations. In Western
Europe, the idea of labor and union representatives sitting on the
Board of Directors of corporations is routine. 7 7 U.S. management
questions whether labor representatives' role as board members is
impeded by their wearing "two hats." Fraser's entrance into the
board room cut across what historically has been separate roles of
management and labor.
Fraser's election to the Chrysler Board is not, however, the first
time in American history where unions have attempted to exert
influence over management. The stormy history of the United Mine
Workers ("UMW") contains a chapter where John L. Lewis and world
industrialist Cyrus Eaton, combined forces to seek control of, or at
least a voice in, the boards of coal companies, electric utility
companies, and certain financial institutions, including San Diego
Power & Light, Western Kentucky Coal Company, and Duquesne
Power & Light. 78 Unions are also becoming aware of the tremendous
power of the largest growing pool of capital in the United States
economy, multi-employer pension plans.
The election of Douglas Fraser to the Board of Directors of a major,
though perhaps failing, United States corporation has not initiated, at
76. The Kellogg Story, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1982, (editorial).
77. B. Zeile, Employee Representativeon the CorporateBoard of Directors:Implications
Under Labor, Antitrust, and CorporateLaw, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 367, 372 (1980).
78. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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least in these past two years, a parade of other labor leaders sitting on
the boards of industrial or manufacturing companies. This experiment
in corporate and union leadership is being watched closely by both
labor and management. First, it is probably not an accident that the
first major corporation to invite a major union leader to sit on its board
was one that was in deep financial and political trouble. Second, over
the past fifteen years, the UAW has participated in one form or
another of shareholder democracy through its ownership of common
shares of stock of Ford, GM, Chrysler, and American Motors. In
1968, during GM's campaign to influence the make-up of the Board of
GM, Leonard Woodcock, then President of the UAW, attended the
GM shareholder meeting to urge the election of minority
representatives to the Board. He did not ask, in his role as
shareholder, that a union leader be elected. It took Fraser's extension
of the principle of corporate ownership to achieve representation on
the Board.
There are possible conflict of interest problems with Fraser,
acting as labor leader, and Fraser, acting as director. The question
arises as to where his loyalties lie, i.e., with the members of his union
who are employees of Chrysler, for whom he is supposed to bargain in
a fiduciary capacity as union leader, or with the shareholders of the
corporation who have elected him to their Board, and to whom he
also owes a fiduciary responsibility as director. There are more subtle
conflict of interest problems also at work, such as the disclosure of
inside information. If management shows the Board of Directors a
highly confidential series of financial projections on the future of
Chrysler, can Fraser use that information in his bargaining with
Chrysler? Would that cause Fraser to be in violation of the insider
and disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws? 79 On the
other hand, would his failure to utilize that information for the benefit
of his union subject him to duty of fair representation charges?
Indeed, if Chrysler does fail, will those who write the future history of
labor and management relations point to Fraser's role on the Board as
an example of why union leaders should never be corporate directors?
From management's view, the danger of having a labor leader on
the Board is the possibility that he might become too dominant a
figure. Someone as talented, articulate and persuasive as Douglas
Fraser may, if he wishes, wield an influence in the corporate board
room far beyond what he should. Labor union leader Fraser may
become the force on the Board that determines the future of Chrysler
Corporation. This is not to say that this would be a bad idea, but
79.

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
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rather that someone who is sitting as a fellow corporate director might
be fearful of sharing power traditionally entrusted to management.
Fraser clearly has more insight into one of the major elements of
making a corporation successful-its labor force-than anyone else
sitting on the Board. Fraser can influence that element of corporate
profitability, i.e., labor costs, more surely and directly than any
combination of people sitting on the Board of Directors.
To exemplify the relationship between union leader and director,
consider a situation where the executive committee of the Board,
which does not include Fraser as a member, proposes to the Board of
Directors the closing of a plant that is represented by Fraser's union.
The purpose of the plant closing is to eliminate a highly unprofitable
and costly operation. The activities of the plant would either be
subcontracted abroad or to another part of the United States which is
not so hospitable to unions. What is Fraser to do? What is the
executive committee to do? What is Fraser's union to do if it learns
that Fraser knew of a plant closing months before it was announced
publicly, and did not do anything about it? This conceptualization
reflects the complexities involved in such an interrelationship and the
heightened likelihood of conflict. It is apparent that only if union
leaders and corporate leaders are willing to lay down adversary roles,
and begin to assume roles that are complementary and supplementary to each other, such as having a member of the union sit on the
board of directors, will United States corporations again be able to
compete on a worldwide basis and create new jobs for America's
unionized work force.
Unions have another source of power for influencing corporate
management; it is the pension fund.
INVESTMENT OF PENSION FUND AND
UNION ASSETS: ITS IMPLICATIONS

Posing the Issues - "Social" and "Economic"
On December 10-11, 1979, the President's Commission on
Pension Policy held hearings in Washington on "The Use of Pension
Fund Capital: Its Social and Economic Implications." The two days' of
hearings concentrated on the issue of who owns Trust Fund 80 assets
(the "trustees" or the "beneficiaries"); who controls their investment
(trustees, contributors or investment advisors); and what "social"
considerations should be taken into account when those assets are
invested.
80. Trust Fund means pension, health and welfare, and other similar type jointly-trusted
benefit trusts.
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The issue of the "social" implications of investments is not a new
one. It was basically the concern of who controls corporations which
led to the passage of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934.
Those laws provided the basis, nearly a decade ago, for the
widely-publicized proxy fight between a coalition of union and public
interest groups and the GM Corporation. The coalition sought 8to1
elect more socially conscious members to the Board of Directors
and to change GM's hiring and promotion policies. "Campaign GM"
was supported by the UAW and its then President, Leonard
Woodcock. The issue again is being hotly debated due to recent
economic developments, i.e., the need for capital in this country; the
forced closings due to the persistent recession; and the shift of
companies and jobs out of the northeast to the "sunbelt," among
others.

82

For unions and union companies, the issue is a simple one:
should union and Trust Fund assets,8 3 created pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, be invested in non-union or anti-union
companies? Put another way: should the assets of unions and Trust
Funds be used actively in order to have an impact beyond their
primary purpose, which is to provide sufficient monies to pay for
pension, health and other benefits?
The following quotes pose the question. The first is a report by
the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 675 Pension
Fund 4 urging the use of assets for social and pro union purposes as
follows:
We in the labor movement can no longer permit professional
money managers to invest our pension fund assets in anti-union
companies or multi-nationals which export work overseas
disregarding the interests of the American workers. We believe
the bottom line of profit should not control our investment policy.
I would remind these huge corporations and multi-nationals
that they do in fact have an obligation to the American system and
its citizens for it is society that gives them their riches and has
caused them to be the profitable institutions which they now are. I
say to you that we will be exploited no longer with our own funds,
81.
82.

M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. 18-19 (1971).
See generally, J. RIFKIN & R. BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN (1978).

83.

Unions have assets in their treasury, and these are of course different from Trust

Fund assets. Different standards of investment may be applicable, but the issue of whether
different standards apply to union assets versus trust assets really has not been tested.
Throughout this article, therefore, we will assume that the same investment standards are
applicable to both union and Trust Fund assets.
84. The report was presented to the President's Pension Commission by Dennis J.
Walton, Business Manager for the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 675, 6-7.
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nor will we stay baffled and apathetic due to nebulous
interpretations of ambiguous regulations.8 5
The second, a report of the National Association of Manufacturers
("NAM"),8 6 states:
Despite the still relatively low level of public exchange over
the issue, business is concerned over the possible consequences of
the Commission prematurely embracing the concept of 'social'
investing.
The NAM believes that the current guidelines of maximum
return for minimum risk [that] must continue to be followed, in
both traditional and non-traditional investing; that investment
managers must continue to be 'prudent' under the most stringent
definition of the term; and that balance and flexibility have proven
to be essential components of any pension policy and therefore,
should not be altered.8 7
The above quotes represent the two schools of thought on how
union assets should be invested. Each must be considered with
respect to the duty of the trustee in achieving the proposed goals.
The State of the Law - What Can Trustees Do
The traditional view and the current state of the law is that a
trustee's principal responsibility is preservation of the Trust Fund's
assets, and their growth through sound investment for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries. This is the standard of fiduciary
duty that is correctly written into ERISA. 88
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 has a similar
standard in that trustees have a duty to administer the Trust Fund for
the "sole and exclusive benefit" of the beneficiaries. 8 9
85. Id.
86. The report to the President's Commission on Pension Policy was presented by Hal
Sebastian, Manager of Benefits for Standard Oil of Ohio, 5.
87. Id.
88. Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1344, a fiduciary shall discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plani
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of Ein enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investment of the plan so as to minimize the risk oflarge losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisiohs of this subchapter.
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Courts have held this to mean that a trustee should look
principally to the safest investments, the most secure, and those
which will produce the highest rate of return consistent with the need
for security of principal. This has meant that in the search for the
growth of assets and a steady rate of return, Trust Fund assets are
heavily invested in companies like IBM, a non-union multi-national
company which has had one of the greatest advances in the value of its
stock over the past fifteen years. The social policies or anti-union
biases of managements or companies have been considered less
important than the "bottom line."
But, within these standardsoffiduciary responsibility, there are
two strategies which unions and trustees can follow. One is the safer
"passive" strategy; the other, the riskier "active" strategy-but not
illegal if applied carefully.
The "Passive Strategy" for Use of Trust Assets
The passive strategy is to withhold investments from companies
which are non-union or anti-union. For example, Trust Fund assets
were not used to purchase stock in J.P. Stevens before Stevens
became unionized; to loan money to J. P. Stevens; or to open accounts
in banks which provided working capital to J. P. Stevens. This passive
strategy of withholding assets has limited results. The strategy's
purpose was to ostracize J.P. Stevens from the "community of right
thinking businesses." But, most "right thinking" and "wrong
thinking" businesses can survive only if they make a profit. The
leverage of being ostracized in the business community has limited
impact, as long as the company and its management remain
profitable. 90
For trustees to withhold investments, they probably would not
need any additional direction of a Trust Agreement or Collective
Bargaining Agreement and their actions would not violate ERISA.
ERISA would not be violated because there would be ample other
investments of comparable nature, e.g., a unionized Levi Strauss
Company instead of J.P. Stevens. A trustee also could argue that J.P.
Stevens is a poor investment because of the financial costs of its
anti-union policies. Examples of this kind of passive strategy by the
following funds and companies over the past several years include
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
90. It was the long term implications of profitability caused by the "corporate campaign"
and series of legal attacks on Stevens by Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
('ACTW U") that led to a change in management at Stevens and a contract with ACTWU.
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International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (South
Africa); Retail Whole and Department Store Union (South Africa);
United Auto Workers (South Africa); AFL-CIO (resolution to "better
serve working people"); United Mine Workers (J.P. Stevens);
Hospital and Health Care Workers (South Africa); International
Ladies Garment Workers Union (labor relations policies); and Control
Data Corporation (socially responsible).
The safer course is to spell out the "passive investment" policies
for trustees. The UAW followed this route in its recent Chrysler
contract, specifically providing guidelines for pro-union and social
investments.91
Specific direction to the trustees regarding the kind of
investments the settlors of the trust wish to consider will protect
trustees from potential suits initiated by a beneficiary whose portfolio
suffered because of those investments.
91. [The UAW's] recent agreement with the Chrysler Corporation provides that up to ten
percent of the net annual income to the UAW-Chrysler Pension Fund will be invested in
residential mortgages and debt obligations of non-profit nursing homes, nursery schools,
federally qualified health maintenance organizations, hospitals or similar non-profit institutions
in a few targeted communities where there are high concentrations of UAW members. The
communities to be targeted will be selected by a Joint Committee annually.
The residential mortgage component of the new agreement will be focused primarily on
single and multiple family dwellings, including cooperatives and condominiums, the purchase
price of which is equal to or below the average purchase price of similar housing in the
communities involved. Mortgages will not be limited to UAW members, but will be offered to
the general public in selected areas.
Investment opportunities in residential mortgages as well as those in socially useful,
non-profit enterprises will be recommended to the trustees of the Pension Fund by a newly
established Investment Advisory committee composed of six members-three appointed by
the Corporation and three appointed by the Union. In the event the members of the Committee
are unable to reach agreement on the recommendations to the trustee, the Impartial Chairman
of the UAW-Chrysler Appeal Board will cast the deciding vote.
It should be noted that the actual independence of the trustees has not been radically
altered; thc trustees continue to have full investment discretion and are bound by law to
exercise the discretion in a prudent manner. The concept of the Investment Advisory
Committee does, however, provide the Union the opportunity to influence investment
decisions made by the trustees.
Both the recommendations of Union and the Investment Advisory Committee must be
considered by the trustees, but the trustees are not bound by these recommendations and they
may reject them if they conclude that the recommended actions are inconsistent with their
fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA.
The UAW-Chrysler Agreement in no way jeopardizes the integrity of the Pension Fund.
Further, it is the hope of the UAW that exposing the trustees to investment opportunities in
socially desirable projects will expand their investment criteria of risk, return and diversification
to include social utility.
The agreement negotiated with Chrysler will not dramatically change the investment
policy of institutional fund managers. [The UAW] believes that it is an important first step In
assuring that the funds which provide benefits for our members are invested in a manner which
recognizes social utility.
Report presented by UAW to President's Commission on Pension Policy 5-6 (1979).
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The "Active Strategy" for the Use of Trust Assets
The active and aggressive strategy has several facets but the
underlying theme is that the Trust assets should be actively used to
bring about a specific objective with a particular corporation or group
of corporations.
One example is through collective bargaining. A union bargains
to have a representative placed on the company's Board of Directors.
Another example is through legislation. This is the European
model. 92 A third way is through the ownership of stock. Trust Fund
assets are used to purchase stock so the Trust Fund becomes a
stockholder in the very company whose policies it wishes to change.
This permits the shareholder to place union members or union
designated people on the Board of Directors. Several examples are
pertinent here. The United Mine Workers of American ("UMW")
owns seventy-five percent of the third largest bank in Washington,
and its top three officers sit on the bank's Board of Directors. The
Amalgamated Bank in New York, as well as the Amalgamated
Insurance Company, have union officers sitting on their boards.
Purchasing shares in non-union or target companies, and
exercising rights of large-yet-minority shareholders provides still
another active strategy. A sufficiently large block of stock can petition
for a seat on the board, as is traditionally done by large investors.
Most managements of public corporations would be hard pressed to
deny one board seat to a representative of a large block of stock.
Individual Trust Funds and large groups of Trust Funds, as well as all
unions and funds of the Building Trades, if their portfolios were
searched, may show that they already own a five to ten percent
interest in a corporation. If that stock then were used to petition for a
seat on the Board of Directors, the director would have a voice in the
shaping of corporate policies. In this way, certain policies could be
reviewed, challenged, and/or vetoed.
Minority shareholders also can influence a company by
threatening or bringing a shareholder's suit. This was done by
ACTWU against J.P. Stevens in order to challenge the company in a
non-labor forum.
Union objectives also may be voiced by buying stock of other
companies which provide services or withholding deposits from banks
which provide working capital to the target company. For example,
the "Corporate Campaign" of J. P. Stevens prevented certain
92. For example, in West Germany and Sweden, under the law a certain percentage of
workers and representatives of organized labor are placed on the board of directors of
corporations.
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directors from serving on the Board of J.P. Stevens, such as a bank in
New York and an insurance company. This was achieved through the
implied threat of withdrawal of several large accounts by
union-related Trust Funds from major New York banks.
Purchasing interests in institutions which are very influential and
profitable in their own right provides another method to utilize
affirmatively Trust Fund assets. Using an earlier example, the UMW
owns a seventy-five percent interest in the third largest bank in
Washington. From that bank, the UMW receives between two and
three million dollars in dividends per year. Large deposits in banks by
unions and related Trust Funds may lead to easier credit
arrangements for beneficiaries. Guaranteeing housing mortgages also
can be considered.
Antitrust Implications of Union-Only Investments
An affirmative investment strategy which targets union-built
construction for pension fund investments has caused some to suggest
that such a scheme raises antitrust problems. The positive act of
investing in union only construction has the negative result of
denying those same monies to others. Opponents allege that this
result implicates the antitrust laws. It is argued that an investment in
union built construction, to the exclusion of non-union investment, is
a "significant and continuing restraint of trade." 93 The antitrust
theory of liability most likely to be raised by a potential contractor
plaintiff is a "concerted refusal to deal." The charge would allege that
the fund agreed (combined, conspired) with the owner, developer or
other involved party to exclude all non-union contractors from the
bidding.
The specific question of whether the antitrust laws should be
applied to a union-only investment strategy has not been addressed
by the courts. However, where the investment decisions comply with
the fiduciary requirements of ERISA, the reasonableness of such a
decision is highlighted and the potential plaintiffs antitrust theories
become unpersuasive.
The Future Developments in the Law of Trust Fund Interest
The antitrust theories also lose potential as the courts show an
interest in the social impact of investments.
[T]he most recent addition to Scott's Law of Trusts, a leading
authority in this area, sanctions trustees taking social factors into
93.

ENG'G NEws-REc., Oct. 8, 1981, at 79.
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consideration in making investment decisions. In doing so they
may 'refrain from allowing the use of the funds in a manner
detrimental to society.' We believe that Scott represents the
cutting edge of the law and is reflective of the
path in which
94
judicial thinking may well develop in this area.
But it hasn't yet. That is the key point to remember. The law has
not yet moved to a standard of "social" investing. Yet, within the
existing fiduciary standard of prudent man investing, there are
opportunities for the imaginative and effective use of union and Trust
Fund assets to advance pro-union and social causes. With careful
examination and planning, such use of fund assets can be highly
effective.
CONCLUSION

There appears to be a fundamental change in labor-management
relations. Whether this is truly a "new era" 9 5 in industrial relations,
or merely a surface change brought about by an unstable economy,
continues to be debated by labor economists and scholars. John
Dunlop, the Harvard professor and former Secretary of Labor,
contends that unions are making concessions merely to keep their
unions in business. "When there is prosperity, the unions will push
for a share of it, and when there is adversity, management will push
the other way. "9 6 Others argue that economic conditions, together
with the rival forces of foreign competition and automation, have
caused changes in attitudes, between the two long time adversaries,
that are here to stay. Perhaps changes in the economic climate have
forced the two sides into a "new era" in industrial relations. However,
tomorrow may find that labor and management have gone "back to
business as usual."
94. Statement of Messrs. Ravikoff and Curzan before President's Commission on Pension
Policy 6-7 (1979).
95. See supra note 3.
96. Id.
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